quences of marketed products, most notably in recent years in regard to data on human clinical trial data or on field trials of new crops (Box 2, Fig. 2 ).
In addition to CBI, companies also protect proprietary information through patents, a means of incentivizing companies to publicly disclose inventions in return for a temporary (20-year) market monopoly. Unlike patents (and copyrights and trademarks), CBI remains secret in perpetuity. And whereas patents are protected by federal statutes in the United States, CBI is covered by both federal and state laws, so CBI held by state regulators can differ from state to state. This patchwork of state law prompted an effort in the 112th US Congress to enact federal trade-secrets legislation (Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012) but it didn't pass, and thus has died. In Europe, trade secrets are handled by individual countries and/or member states of the European Union.
A subset of CBI termed trade secrets has legal protection. According to Elizabeth Rowe, professor of law at the Levin College of Law, the University of Florida in Gainesville, "A wide range of [CBI] , including customer lists, sales records, pricing information and customer information, can be protectable trade secrets. Some jurisdictions have also granted tradesecret protection to secret contract terms, marketing strategies and industry studies; negative information- [comprising] failed research or an ineffective process-is also protected 1 . "
In a 1982 landmark case, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard arguments in Public Citizen versus FDA, which involved a request for clinical data from several manufacturers on the safety and efficacy data (post-marketing) for intraocular lenses. Public Citizens' Health Research Group, a nonprofit consumer advocacy organization concerned with health and safety issues, was secrecy? And how should a society balance the competitiveness of its industries on one hand and the public's right to know about marketed products on the other?
What is CBI?
To protect commercially sensitive information from reaching the public sphere, companies across all sectors invoke CBI (sometimes referred to as confidential commercial information or CCI). From pharmaceuticals to food to tobacco, the default position of a company is to sequester product information deemed important for its business (Fig. 1) . This commercial imperative often brings companies into conflict with researchers who seek data to understand the human health and environmental conse-R egulators have a treasure trove of information in their vaults, but much of it will never see the light of day because it is designated confidential business information (CBI). A patchwork of vaguely worded legislation on CBI in different jurisdictions enables companies to keep secret vast swathes of information submitted for regulatory approval-everything from composition of drugs to safety signals from consumer products. But as calls for greater openness and data disclosure in the research community grow louder, and medical practitioners become increasingly perturbed by the extent of bias in the clinical trial data literature, industry is coming under increasing pressure to reevaluate the types of data that it keeps behind closed doors.
Recent years have witnessed a growing chorus of criticism about data disclosure practices in the pharmaceutical industry. This has prompted parliamentary inquiries in the United Kingdom and spurred US and European government agencies to launch transparency initiatives on clinical data. Industry, too, is finally responding, with several European big pharma companies creating a system (http://www.clinicalstudydatarequest. com/) for releasing reports on human-testing data on approved drugs, at least to those individuals who qualify under their rules. Johnson & Johnson (New Brunswick, NJ, USA) has also declared its intention to release clinical trial data to an academic group, Yale's Open Data Access program (Box 1).
At the heart of all this are two questions. When do the interests of the public and research community in understanding the health and environmental risks of products trump industry's business imperatives for difficult to characterize the exact active ingredient and protein sequence of an approved drug product (Fig. 1) .
Last year, Rader was sufficiently exasperated to file a Citizen Petition with the FDA highlighting the problem 3 . In it, he comments that "there is now negligible or even no product/ agent identity-related information, including concerning CMC [chemistry, manufacture and control], bioprocessing and quality aspects, being disclosed by FDA in the public domain. FDA review documentation nowadays often includes no descriptive or summary product/ agent identity-related information. " He goes on: "This situation is unacceptable in the context of current science, understanding of the nature of biopharmaceuticals, and expectations and legal requirements for FDA making the most basic public exposures about its approved products. "
The FDA would not comment on Rader's Citizen's Petition, but cited regulations that specify disclosable information on safety and efficacy of approved drugs, implying they were compliant with regulations. In response Rader replied, "The bottom line [is this]: Is the most basic description product information (that is everything) about products inherently proprietary-they start out presumed 100% proprietary, which appears to be the current state-of-affairs? Or is basic descriptive/defining information inherently public information, unless actually of value to competitors, with genuine competitor-assisting information readily spotted when encountered, even by FDA staff, many or most of whom lack realworld experience?"
Secrecy on trials
Nowhere has the intransigence of industry with regards to CBI and trade secrets seeded more controversy than with regard to human data related to the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals -whether those data are in the hands of regulators or in company vaults.
A casual perusal of summary reports released by regulators regarding the safety and efficacy of a new drug reveals that a substantial portion of the information relating to risk and benefit is redacted. Not only are data on side effects and effectiveness blanked out by thick black rectangles, but even names of trials can be obscured, hiding knowledge of where and how many trials on a product have been carried out. This is standard practice, but it is coming under increasing criticism from academic researchers who are frustrated by the pervasiveness of CBI in regulatory documents. Government and industry have been vigorously fighting a rearguard action to maintain the CBI defense in the face of increasing ular, exemption 4 broadly written covers trade secrets and any information that is commercial, financial, privileged or confidential. This exemption essentially provides an all-purpose get-out for companies stating that information that puts them at a competitive disadvantage is exempt from release 2 (Box 3, Table 1 ).
Product noninformation
Whereas FDA's definition of a trade secret appears to include only information related to the commercial production of a commodity, in practice, the agency appears to be applying CBI much more broadly. According to Ron Rader, president of The Biotechnology Information Institute (Rockville, MD, USA), a provider of information on new biologics, the past three decades has witnessed a marked increase in the amount of redacted information-information such as the active ingredient, processing and quality aspects, purity and potency-characterizing a biopharmaceutical approved for marketing. According to Rader, much more detailed product information was made available by manufacturers and the FDA in the early days of biotech. Now, perhaps as a response to increased commercial pressure from brand manufacturers to maintain secrecy in the face of increasing generic and biosimilar competition, the agency keeps much more information under wraps. The issue is so pervasive that Rader finds in some cases that it is requesting the data to assist consumers' understanding of the risks and benefits of the lens. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) declined to reveal information about these lenses, claiming trade secret protection for the companies. The court disagreed with the FDA's definition of trade secrets and ruled that the agency had to show a direct relationship between the information and the production process. As a result, according to the current code of regulation concerning trade secrets, 21CFR20.61(a), the FDA defines trade secrets as follows: "any commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort. " The European Medicines Agency (EMA) defines CBI as "information not in the public domain, where disclosure undermines the economic interests of the owner of the information, including not only trade secrets but also commercial confidences, such as business plans and marketing strategies. "
Thus Device manufacturer Medtronic voluntarily handed over to independent analysts all of its patient-level data on its recombinant bone morphogenetic protein product (rhBMP-2), Infuse, approved in 2002 for spinal fusion procedures. This move followed criticisms of false and misleading claims deriving from 20 articles published by trial investigators. The Yale University Open Data Access Program (YODA) program, which was set up in 2011 to provide greater access to clinical trial data, was perfectly suited for such a study, and the company handed over all the patient data for review by two different academic groups (along with $2.5 million to fund the studies).
The two reviews came to the same conclusion: the product is not superior to the standard of care (bone graft). According to Medtronic CMO Rick Kuntz, the trials were not designed to show superiority, but rather to show equivalency; claims of superiority were made in the publications, by what Kuntz describes as "well-meaning, championing individuals." (Medtronic researchers did not author or co-author the publications, although there are some conflicting reports in the media that they were involved nonetheless.) The full impact of the YODA study has not yet been felt, according to Kuntz. However, he feels the exercise presages things to come. "I understand that people are cautious about data getting out, but one thing that people should realize is that this is going to happen. If you don't think your data is out there it's probably already hacked. It might be better to give a legitimate set of data, rather than the hacked stuff," Kuntz said.
LD f e AT U R e npg Several governments around the world had stockpiled Tamiflu on the basis that it would mitigate complications in the event of a pandemic. Cochrane established that many of these decisions appear to have been based on incomplete data and determined that data from only two out of ten trials carried out by Roche were in the public record. Cochrane subsequently had to fight a six-year battle to obtain data for the missing eight trials. Over that time, Roche provided numerous stalling arguments-including that data had been provided to another researcher and therefore didn't need to be provided, that Cochrane had already been sent the data (which it had not) and that patient confidentiality would be compromised-all of which served to delay data release to the researchers. The commercial incentive to bury information can be particularly troublesome for 'offlabel' use of an existing approved drug in a new indication. In such cases, when a supplemental license for that indication has not yet formally been registered with a regulator, companies are under no legal obligation to disclose results at all and thus often choose to secrete them away. One of the most notorious examples of this type of behavior is GlaxoSmithKline's off-label trials of Paxil (paroxetine) for use in childhood depression in the late 1990s and early 2000s. After carrying out several trials in children that showed no benefit, an internal memo was circulated indicating that "it would be commercially unacceptable to include a statement that efficacy had not been demonstrated. " To make matters worse, the company made no attempt to report to EMA the serious side effects of the drug-side effects that included suicidal thoughts and behaviors. When all of this came to light, the resulting controversy prompted changes to European Union regulations obliging companies to hand over safety data for uses outside of a drug's marketing authorization. Crucially, however, companies still have a puzzling get-out clause in which trials are exempt from disclosure if conducted outside the EU.
Nonetheless, some companies are not willing to take the chance that what they consider sensitive information might leak out of regulatory documents, particularly when FDA advisory committees are convened. FDA is required by law to make materials available to the public before they meet, so interested citizens can review and comment. This prompted Pfizer to extract an agreement from the FDA in April to present only summary data on its inhaled insulin therapy, Exubera, during an advisory committee meeting that was considering a related product currently under review, Mannkind's Afrezza. And this for a product (Exubera) that ruling in 2010. According to the decision, there were neither commercial data nor confidential patient data in the clinical study reports (CSRs)-documents, sometimes thousands of pages long, containing information on the plan for statistical analysis of trial data and containing detailed descriptions of patient outcomes and adverse events. EMA was thus instructed to hand over the CSRs to the Cochrane team.
Although this spat emphasizes how broad interpretations of CBI by regulators can cause delays in data release to researchers, it represents the tip of a missing-data iceberg. Often companies sequester information completely (rather than releasing it to regulators in a CBIredacted form) as a defensive measure to slow negative news about its marketed products from leaking out.
A case in point is the recent updated analysis by Cochrane on the effectiveness of Roche's Tamiflu (oseltamivir) in reducing the rate of "complications" associated with influenza.
requests for clinical data (Box 3). In 2007, the Cochrane Collaboration (Oxford, UK) sought to obtain from the EMA trial information on two diet drugs, Roche's Xenical (orlistat) and Sanofi-aventis' Acomplia (rimonabant; now withdrawn). EMA responded that it could not supply the reports because of CBI concerns. When further requests were rebutted by the agency, the Cochrane researchers resorted to the European Ombudsman, an individual that investigates complaints of maladministration in European Union institutions.
EMA subsequently kept up its CBI defense, countering that information relating to the design and execution of the trials in question was CBI because it related to company strategy. The agency also argued that patient lives were not at risk and that the burden of proof was on Cochrane researchers to demonstrate such a risk existed (even though the researchers did not have the clinical data to do so). At the end of a tortuous, three-year process, the ombudsman published a final Figure 1 Large swaths of regulatory documents-sometimes running into tens of pages-can be redacted by regulatory agencies if they feel the information can produce competitive harm. (Reproduced from Center for Drug evaluation and Research of the fDA, Application number 125294Orig1s000.) f e AT U R e npg Scientists working in the agbiotech sector depend on access to information about commercial biotech crops to do their jobs, and they too often find their work stymied by claims of CBI and other confidentiality roadblocks. Various reasons exist for why scientists need detailed data on crops-to benchmark work against a commercial product, or to conduct safety or feeding studies or monitor transgene escape. extension specialists at land-grant universities are expected to evaluate the performance of new plant products in order to educate local growers and the public. "Are these picky scientists just trying to go after the companies and making up reasons to do so? No," says Deborah Letourneau, an ecologist at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Part of a scientist's job is to assess the quality of others' research, she says. "The quality of the knowledge that we have is judged by what questions were asked and how well they were answered."
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), a part of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) that oversees the release of biotech crops in the environment, makes some documents available to the public, but increasingly, key information is being marked CBI, and thus kept secret. In fact, the occurrence of the word "CBI" in regulatory documents coming through the agency has increased eightfold over the last 20 years, according to data from Information Systems for Biotechnology (ISB) in Blacksburg, Virginia, a group hosted by Virginia Tech that maintains a comprehensive database pertaining to the regulatory review of GM plants and animals.
Upon a request from Nature Biotechnology, ISB ran a query for the text string "CBI" in its database. It came up with 276 instances of CBI in 1993 and 2,072 in 2013, mostly related to the organism's phenotype, the gene of interest and gene donor. One might expect the increase in CBI to correlate with a general increase in field trials or other development activity over the same time period, but that isn't the case. Although CBI has increased steadily, the number of field tests peaked in 2002 and then steadily declined, according to ISB's data (Fig. 2) .
Some amount of confidentiality is clearly necessary to protect industry trade secrets. Whether the secrecy has reached a level of "excessive" depends on the point of view, says Jeffrey Wolt, an agronomist with Iowa State University (Ames, IA, USA) who previously worked for Dow AgroSciences (Indianapolis, IN, USA). "The starting point for industry people is that everything should be CBI," he says. "As a public sector scientist I'm frustrated at times. But from my industry background I wonder, is there a reason I shouldn't have access to that information?"
One strategy that worked for Wolt when he was unable to obtain information from APHIS was to approach a regulatory agency abroad. In 2010, while analyzing protein mixtures for toxicity in stacked insect resistance products, Wolt needed data on protein concentrations, which are routinely reported as part of safety packages submitted to regulatory agencies. Through APHIS, Wolt was only able to find summaries, not the actual data points. However, Australia's Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (OGTR) provided him with richer detail, and when that did not have quite the depth of the information he needed, he went straight to the source: the seed company, which provided the reports he needed.
Other researchers interviewed by Nature Biotechnology said they had good experiences when they approached seed companies or regulatory agencies for data. Michelle Marvier, a biologist at Santa Clara University in California, used a combination of fOIA requests and direct requests to APHIS, the US environmental Protection Agency (ePA), and St. Louis-based Monsanto. APHIS "was very helpful," she says. "They sent me hard copies of the petitions in enormous boxes. They had redacted any CBI with a black Sharpie. The info held back from me tended to be details of the transgene, like sequence level data. I wasn't interested in that anyhow." The ePA, which was funding Marvier, "forked everything over on CDs," she says. "I also received significant cooperation and data from Monsanto."
But in other cases, the details of redacted material are of interest. Scientists who study transgene escape say CBI and other proprietary information severely limits the tools they can use to monitor the escape of transgenes. In a 2008 paper in BioScience, Norman ellstrand, a professor of genetics at the University of California, Riverside, and his coauthors wrote that the application of monitoring tools "is likely to require access to information on the genetic makeup of transgenic organisms-information that is often proprietary" 17 . The authors noted that lack of information about the history and ecology of hybridization between the crop and the wild population, the DNA sequence of the transgenic construct, the linkage relationships between the transgene and marker genes, and the availability of crop-specific markers could all limit the application of population genetics tools.
The government's own agencies have trouble accessing the information they need. A National Research Council committee tasked with reviewing decision making at APHIS documented its frustrations with CBI in its 2002 report Environmental Effects of Transgenic Plants: the Scope and Adequacy of Regulation 18 . The committee wrote that it could not fully do its job because so much of the information from APHIS was redacted due to CBI. "It felt like being a reviewer for a scientific paper and the journal sends you, as the reviewer, the title, abstract, intro, results and discussions, but doesn't send you the methods," says Letourneau, who was a committee member. "I was saying: 'When do we get access to the actual studies the companies did?' And someone explained to me, as if I was asking a silly question: 'That's CBI'." Committee members were told that if they wanted to see the confidential information, they would have to appear on site at USDA and would not be allowed to make copies, says Letourneau. "No one on the committee did that. We all have jobs," she says.
Whether the rules governing CBI are accomplishing the goal of protecting sensitive company information or erecting unnecessary barriers to interested parties is debatable. Bruce Tabashnik of the University of Arizona (Tucson) was told by the ePA that spatial information on plantings of insecticidal crops is protected because it is CBI. Meanwhile, a for-profit company, GfK Kynetec (St. Louis, MO, USA), collects similar information from farmers and sells it at costs that are prohibitive for researchers like Tabashnik, but likely not for competitor companies. Without going into specifics, the ePA responded to questions about this practice, "When someone states that certain information claimed as confidential is identical to information that can be obtained through publicly available sources, frequently the two sets of information are not identical," while claiming that both the public availability of the information as well as its cost would enter into agency's determination of eligibility for confidential treatment.
Emily Waltz, Nashville, Tennessee Box 2 CBI down on the farm f e AT U R e npg independent researchers 4 . In April, AbbVie reportedly dropped its suit against the EMA when the agency agreed to redactions suggested by the company before release (p. 507 News Briefs). What the impact of this decision will be on future data releases is not yet known, especially as the InterMune case is still pending.
prompted AbbVie (No. Chicago, IL, USA) and InterMune (Brisbane, CA, USA) to obtain interim injunctions stopping EMA from releasing CSRs relating to Humira (adalimumab) and Estriet (perfidenone), respectively. Since that case, document release has slowed, according to Hans-Georg Eichler, senior medical officer at EMA, a trend that has been documented by had been pulled from the market seven years before.
Lifting the veil?
Two years ago, the EMA adopted a new policy on transparency of company drug data, and released over a million pages of regulatory documents. Unfortunately, this action also
The freedom of Information Act (fOIA), first enacted almost 50 years ago (and amended most recently in 2007), was put in place to provide to the public access to the workings of the federal government. fOIA requires that each agency make its records promptly available to requesters, except for certain sensitive areas, such as national defense, personal information protected by privacy provisions and confidential business information 19 . The principle behind having exemptions is to prevent the disclosure of information that Congress feels is in the public's interest to protect. Were the government to disclose information that they require companies to submit-for defense contracts or drug approvals, for exampleit could compromise their ability to continue to collect such information in the future. In addition, serious legal consequences exist, fines and even imprisonment, for anyone in government who reveals trade secrets. Hence, the agencies seem to err on the side of caution, to the extent of joining at considerable cost, the defense of a company's right to privacy in court. The first step in obtaining information under the fOIA is to determine which agency has the information that is being sought. Once that is established, a fOIA request can be made but it must specify an extant record, it cannot simply request information about a product or service-that is, the agency does not have to create a document to satisfy a fOIA request. The agency has 20 days to determine whether to comply or it has to identify reasons for not complying. To expedite handling of fOIA requests, which can number in the tens of thousands per year for a single agency, a series of tracks were established-simple, not requiring research or other action on the part of the fOIA officer; complex, for documents that require analysis for sensitive information and possible redaction; and expedited, for matters of urgency.
each agency has its own office for handling fOIA requests, follows its own practices and reports annually on the number of requests and time to complete, among other data points ( Table 1) . Companies are informed when a request for information is made to an agency and given the opportunity to declare it CBI, if they haven't already done so. The agencies are not required to honor their request, and must determine independently whether information is covered by exemption 4. Having some CBI within a document does not preclude its release, but those sections considered CBI are redacted before release.
The agency's data show that the time to process simple requests is less than a month on average, whereas the complex requests take considerably longer, half a year or more. Once the courts get involved, either by the requester suing for access that had been denied or by a company filing a so-called reverse fOIA to prevent a regulatory agency from releasing their information, the process can be quite protracted, stretching into years. (The oldest pending case before the fDA was filed in 2008 and has been pending for 1,354 days.) for example, in 2011, the AIDS Healthcare foundation (Los Angeles) challenged fDA and Gilead in the Central District Court of California regarding the company's supplemental application for expanded use of the AIDS drug Truvada (emtricitabine and tenofovir disoproxil fumarate) for pre-exposure prophylaxis in uninfected individuals. According to general counsel for the foundation, Tom Meyers, the foundation was concerned that the availability of a preventative could unintentionally lead to riskier sexual behavior and, subsequently, more HIV infections. "Truvada can be prescribed off-label. The approval for large-scale use is questionable," Meyers argued, before the fDA issued its approval. The foundation requested under fOIA documents on the safety and efficacy of Truvada, as well as communication between the agency and the company concerning the application for supplemental use. The fOIA request was denied based on the possibility of causing competitive harm (exemption 4), but the court ruled that exemption 4 did not apply to safety and efficacy data provided in the application, having found no evidence of competition in the space for pre-exposure prophylaxis. Although the court ruled in the foundation's favor, it took nearly three years from the time the fOIA request was filed for the case to be decided, two years after the fDA approved the indication.
Two recent reviews have been done of government transparency and fOIA administration, one by the US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 20 (under Darrell Issa, R-CA) in 2012 and a more recent one by the Center for effective Government, a nonprofit watch-dog group based in Washington, DC 21 . Both gave the US Department of Health and Human Services, of which the fDA is a part, a grade of D. LD Box 3 Navigating the FOIA universe 9 . In addition to reiterating that BIO members will register, at minimum, all clinical trials beyond phase 1 in EudraCT or ClinicalTrials.gov (companies are legally bound to post on the latter anyway in compliance with the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007), industry members commit their companies to post technical summary results of all clinical trials for approved products, or products discontinued in development, for all indications, regardless of whether trial outcomes are positive or negative. The statement suggests these results should be posted in a "clinical trials database, " but does not specify further.
The BIO principles also commit members to provide summaries of trials to participants and to submit the results of all phase 3 clinical trial studies for publication in the literature or "otherwise make [them] available to the scientific community (i.e., on a company-sponsored website, at an appropriate scientific conference, etc.). " No timeline was given for when a company would need to disclose such data, nor was there any check on compliance.
Finally, for approved medicines, the principles state that "each BIO member company will fulfill qualified requests from medical and scientific researchers for additional clinical trial data (e.g., CSRs, patient-level clinical datasets, clinical study designs and protocols, etc.) beyond those shared proactively with the public. To facilitate this process, each BIO member company will develop and make available to the public its own criteria, procedures and timelines for determining the qualification of specific requests for clinical trial data. This still leaves the responsibility for managing the process in the hands of the companies, and provides no remedy for noncompliance. But Jonathan Leff, a partner at Deerfield Management, a healthcare investment firm who sits on BIO's board, points out that the guidelines were deliberately crafted to provide some flexibility, particularly for small biotech companies, who make up a sizeable portion of their membership. "The idea that a process be prescribed, that a company be required to go through a particular process, could be burdensome on a small company without the people or resources, " he says.
Much of what is contained in the BIO principles is already in place, in accordance with FDAAA, but the emphasis is shifting to greater transparency, according to BIO's director of scimeaning there is no information in the data that would allow them to be linked to a specific product, and de-identified to protect patient privacy. They cite several instances where aggregated data from multiple drug studies have been used by the agency itself to identify potential endpoints and safety issues. The idea is that allowing other non-FDA experts to conduct similar studies would "advance public health and innovation in regulatory decision making" 7 .
The comment period for the FDA masking and de-identifying proposal ended on October 31, 2013, and as of May 6, 38 comments had been received from various medical organizations and lobbying groups, as well as individuals. Most comments expressed some concern over the scope of the information being released and the potential uses that could be made of information, as well as the additional burden to the agency in preparing data for release (although it's not clear who would be responsible for doing the hand-off to requesters).
Industry responds
Industry lobbying groups have been quick to object to transparency proposals from Cochrane, Alltrials.net and others. Whereas they espouse having a shared interest in providing data, two pharma lobbying groups (the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, or EFPIA, and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, PhRMA) released their own set of principles, which put limits on which data are subject to release and review (only future trials) and put themselves in the position of deciding what information is released and to whom. Whereas the companies propose that these decisions be made by independent review boards, the composition of the boards would In April 2013, the Cochrane Collaboration called for the European Parliament to require the disclosure of CSRs on drugs, rather than summary data, which is currently all that is required in the European Union and the United States 5 . In response to this and other such calls, regulatory agencies and industry lobbying groups in the United States and in Europe are currently debating various transparency initiatives.
The EMA's Publication and Access to Clinical Trial Data 6 initiative defines three levels of access to information on clinical trials on which regulatory decisions are based: first, no access for such things as product details and characterization, in vitro studies and bioanalytical data; second, open access when patient protection is not an issue, such as aggregated data or data that have had personal data de-identified, or where there is an overriding public interest; and three, controlled access, in which case the requester must meet several requirements, among them, to identify themselves, to agree to do only specified studies, to not share data or try to identify patients, to refrain from using information for market authorization, and to make results public within a year. Mandatory posting of summary results in the European Clinical Trials Database (EudraCT) is slated to be implemented this summer.
In the United States, the FDA, in accordance with its Transparency Initiative (part of a Regulatory Science Initiative being undertaken in collaboration with the US National Institutes of Health) put forward a proposal for masking and de-identifying nonsummary safety and efficacy drug data, which stops short of advocating release of clinical trial data or CSRs. Under the terms of the proposal released last June, the agency offers to release both preclinical and clinical study data that are masked, f e AT U R e npg free rider scenario. Small biotechs might be particularly vulnerable because favorable safety data and preliminary efficacy data from an early trial might alert a larger pharma company that could invest vast resources into large clinical trials and beat the small company to approval. The situation in Europe over the past two years presents a convenient laboratory for seeing just what the consequences are of releasing company clinical trial data. The 'free rider' scenario doesn't exist according to Eichler, who said that they have been looking and asking those making these claims for examples of this for over a year and have yet to find one.
There remains some dispute as to whether the principle of releasing trial data is anticompetitive. Eichler says "We consider that not a risk, but an opportunity for data sharing. And we don't consider this anti-competitive but rather pro-competitive. It will enable competition. " Furthermore, Wood points out that some gave the same argument when ClinicalTrials. gov was set up, and yet nothing terrible happened. "There's not a single company, single person starting in a clinical trial either in industry or in academia, who wouldn't first check ClinicalTrials.gov. They all do, " he says.
In addition, surveys show that over 70% of people say they would be in favor of sharing personal health information to advance medical research 16 . Says Peter Doshi, associate editor at the British Medical Journal and assistant professor of pharmaceutical health services research at the University of Maryland's School of Pharmacy, "The informed consent forms perhaps were equally remiss in not saying to prospective trial participants that 'the data might be sequestered and never shared with anyone, never released and never used to make generalizable medical knowledge. Are you okay with this?' You know, I don't see that in the forms. "
Conclusions
In the twenty-first century-and in the wake of WikiLeaks and revelations about US National Security Agency surveillance data-demands for increased openness in society is sending ripples through government. At the same time, the research community is placing more emphasis on the need for data transparency and data sharing, particularly with a view to the clinical literature on human safety and efficacy testing related to commercially approved products. Changes are coming, both for the way in which regulators handle commercial data and how liberally industry will be able to define what it thinks is CBI.
At the moment, industry and regulators appear to be fighting a rearguard action andwith the exception of Johnson & Johnson -dragging their heels and refusing to hand Kesselheim, a researcher in the Department of Health Policy and Management at the Harvard School of Public Health.
Another key concern, according to Francer, is to avoid the public's second-guessing regulatory decisions, which could potentially undermine the integrity of the process and erode public trust in regulatory agencies. Regulatory decisions might be challenged with a "fervor hitherto unknown, " says Francer, which could result in an already under-resourced agency like the FDA having to commit additional time and energy into defending their decisions or conducting additional studies.
Worse yet is the possibility of a secondary analysis of trial data that are of poor quality, showing previously unreported harm. This might then require regulators and companies to act, to review data again, if not to conduct further studies. Alistair Wood, partner at investment house Symphony Capital (New York), says the concern is there are "a bunch of people that never do studies themselves, that spend their time critiquing everyone else's work, and [possibly] doing poorly done meta-analysis and that will cause a huge panic over something. " EMA's Eichler cites the widely reported suicide death of a rock star who had been taking Pfizer's smoking deterrent agent Chantix (varenicline). Although no studies were ever done to establish a link, the media frenzy resulted in thousands of lawsuits and settlements in the hundreds of millions of dollars 11 .
Several examples exist where analyses were done and previously unreported adverse effects were discovered. In 2010, researchers conducted a meta-analysis of angiotensin II inhibitors used in treating various cardiovascular disorders, because of concerns about the association of angiotensin II receptors with cell proliferation. They scoured data from five trials, looking for incidences of cancer and found a slightly increased risk 12 . However, when the EMA looked at a larger collection of studies, the connection disappeared 13 .
Another example is a meta-analysis of 17 clinical trials for inhaled anticholinergics for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease that uncovered a risk for cardiovascular events. The re-review by FDA found the analysis wanting in several respects-biased sample, no long-term follow-up, no accounting for discontinuation differences among groups of patients 14 . Even the Cochrane re-analysis of Tamiflu has been criticized as underpowered statistically and failing to take into account all clinical data available 15 .
A final concern with the release of clinical trial data, particularly for early phase 1 safety trials, is that it could divulge valuable information to potential competitors-the so-called ence and regulatory affairs, Andrew Womack. However, much is still left in the hands of the companies. "There's been a realization that there is tremendous value in responsibly sharing data. That said, we feel strongly that in the data sharing process there's a very important role for the sponsor of the trials as the driver.
That's what our principles reflect, " Womack says.
Individual companies have also begun to address clinical trial transparency. In December, GlaxoSmithKline promised to make detailed data from its clinical trials available to 'qualifying' individual researchers. In January, Sanofi announced it would join Roche, Boehringer Ingelheim and ViiV Healthcare (a joint venture between Pfizer and Glaxo) to use Glaxo's portal for data sharing (https://clinicalstudydatarequest.com/). The majority of these initiatives involve clinical data on products approved from 2014 (Glaxo's cut off goes back to 2000) and do not cover off-label trial data.
Pushback
Whether CBI designations are overdone may be in the eye of the beholder. Jeff Francer, vice president and senior counsel for PhRMA, who previously worked in the general counsel office at the FDA, which advises the agency regarding the legality of FOIA requests, thinks the FDA does a "terrific job" with managing the process. "They do a thorough job going through documents to determine which type of information is competitively valuable and why it makes specific regulatory decisions, " he says. Furthermore, there is good reason to be cautious about the public release of patient level data provided to regulators, he says. A primary consideration is patient privacy and the possibility of re-identifying de-identified patient data. Many of these concerns refer to a report last year in Science in which researchers were able to identify 50 people whose genomes were published anonymously, based on information in public databases 10 . Although no drug studies were involved with this particular exercise, it did illustrate the ease with which public databases can be mined for information on individuals. This scenario certainly becomes more plausible if patient genomic information were to be associated with health records and trial data.
Others claim although de-identification is time consuming and costly, it should not be a problem except perhaps for orphan or rare diseases, where the patient population is small. "I think that people who cling to this idea that there's no way of making clinical trial data transparent because we can't assure the privacy of the people involved in the trials, that view is quickly becoming obsolete, " says Aaron f e AT U R e npg perusing the literature base their decisions on an incomplete, biased sample of all the clinical evidence-and as a result make misguided prescription decisions, decisions that can inflict unnecessary suffering and even death on patients. The concept of CBI is not the sole reason for this bias in the literature and the withholding of important, potentially lifesaving data. But it is a substantial contributor to the problem.
The need for companies to retain trade secrets to remain competitive is indisputable, yet, they must also be held accountable for products that they wish to take to market, and provide the information that supports the safety and efficacy of their products. Where the balance lies between these competing interests is still a matter of debate. Regulators must also balance the needs of open research with the needs of industry. EMA will likely have been listening keenly to the words of Justin McCarthy, senior vice president and associate general counsel at Pfizer, who recently went on the record as saying further release of CBI could force firms "to make a choice between filing in Europe and potentially losing the ability to get exclusivity in other parts of the world-or filing in those other countries to preserve exclusivity. "
And despite talk of harmonization and cooperation, particularly between US and European regulators, there still seems to be distance between what is considered privileged on either side of the pond. Whether that gap can or will be filled remains to be seen, as both agencies have yet to reveal their final guidances.
over data to third parties without a high level of scrutiny. The laxity with which companies and government agencies define CBI means that it is applied across the board as a smokescreen to block requests for data associated with marketed products. As Ron Rader puts it: "The FDA remains a black hole-incredible amounts of biologics product/information go in, but nothing useful comes out. " In the United States, the patchwork of state legislation exacerbates the opaqueness of what is and what isn't CBI and trade secrets. Those who seek to challenge a CBI block on requests for information must face years in the courts to reach a resolution, no matter how compelling their arguments (Box 3).
On the other hand, CBI and trade secrets are essential for businesses to maintain their competitiveness. They are especially important to keep confidential data associated with unapproved drugs that are making their way through the regulatory process-and where competitors developing similar drugs might otherwise gain an advantage if such information fell into their hands. In addition, the federal government has wielded considerable power over companies through corporate integrity agreements, where firms settle criminal and/or civil charges by agreeing to rigorous federal oversight, which again is done largely outside the public view; last year, a US District Court judge ruled that Pfizer, Purdue Pharmaceuticals and the Department of Health and Human Services could keep secret some portions of companies' submissions related to improper and illegal activities involving drug sales and marketing practices and the like, despite a challenge from Public Citizen.
But perhaps the most important question is, is the imperative for CBI as justifiable for products that have already received approval as for those that have not yet been approved? Should researchers and physicians not be able to access all the human testing data associated with a company's product that was submitted to regulators as part of the process of drug registration? Currently, regulators don't think so-they are content to provide product summaries replete with redacted text. Doctors f e AT U R e npg
